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Clinical Psychology

Effects of Judges' Instructions in Court Proceedings on Juror
Memory for Facts (89 pp.)
Director:

Herman A. Walters

Subjects recruited from college undergraduate classes (n = 120)
in three groups (n = 40 for each group) served as "experimental"
jurors and viewed a videotaped reenactment of an excerpt from a
civil trial. The trial involved negligence in the death of a
young man on a construction project. Group One viewed a tape that
included four pieces of inadmissible evidence, a judge's ruling on
inadmissibility and a judge's admonishment to the jurors (subjects)
to disregard the inadmissible testimony. Group Two viewed an
edited version of the same tape which included the inadmissible
testimony and the judge's rulings but did not include the
admonishment. Group Three (control) viewed the tape on which both
the judge's rulings and admonishments had been deleted.
Results indicated that jurors in both Group One and Group Two
recalled correct information on one of four memory items (embedded
in the dependent measures) significantly more often than jurors in
Group Three. On this same item, all three groups expressed a high
mean confidence rating in the correctness of their answer, with
Group One expressing the greatest confidence, followed by Group
Two and then Group Three. On a second memory item (of the four).
Group Throe recalled correct information significantly more often
than Group Two. Taken as a composite measure, there were no
significant differences among the three groups on the four memory
items, therefore disconfirming the research hypothesis that jurors
who were exposed to more information (e.g., judge's rulings and
instructions) regarding inadmissible evidence would recall that
information more often than jurors who had not heard the judicial
rulings and admonishments.
Additional findings indicated that there were no differences for
sox, ago, or experimental condition on the case-outcome decision.
The mean confidence rating for this decision revealed that all
subjects felt very confident in their verdicts. Of note is the
fact that subjects' decisions regarding negligence paralleled the
decisions made by jurors in the actual trial.
The possible explanations for the mixed findings are discussed
as well as general research findings on the memory process that
support the possible explanations. Directions for future
investigations on memory and its significance in the juridic
process were proposed.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

In 1966, a lawyer and political scientist, James Marshall,
assessed the American trail-by-jury system and found it to be ignorant
of the most elementary of psychological principles.

His primary

criticism was of the assumptions made by the rulemakers on points of
evidentiary admissibility and instruction— instructions concerning lay
inference and perception on the part of jurors.
aptly titled Law and Psychology in Conflict.

Marshall's book was

The counter-accusation

was aimed at social scientists who conducted research without an
adequate understanding of the legal framework to which their studies
purportedly pertain.

Indeed, the history of psycholegal research has

been described as a succession of interchanges between optimistic
psychologists attempting to "redeem" the law and a reactive legal
community rejecting the generalization of laboratory research to real
life (Loh, 1981).

Until recent time, an uneasy partnership has

prevailed, with occasional outright hostility, each side carrying on
"as though the other did not exist" (Fahr, 1961).
More recently, a collaborative effort has been evidenced with an
increasing consciousness that psychological research requires more
sensitivity to the lawyer's point of view (Loh, 1981).

In addition,

the conflict has been reduced by the formation of a group of
specialists in psycholegal studies.

In the past, most of the people

writing on psychology and law did not have the subject as their
-

1

-
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principal professional interest (Saks, 1979).

Some knowledge of how

the law defines, analyzes and manages problems is needed in undertaking
applied research on law.
Rather than the two disciplines working in opposition, it is now
more frequently the case that scholars are engaging in research
specifically tailored to address certain court issues, as exemplified
in jury studies.

The jury trial in the United States, although

comprising only about 10 percent of actual cases, has been the focus of
particular concern to researchers interested in the formal legal
process (Bray & Kerr, 1982; Ellison & Buckout, 1981; Hastie, Penrod &
Pennington, in press; Konecni & Ebbesen, 1982; Nemeth, 1981; Saks &
Kidd, 1981; Sales, 1981).

As Simon (1975) points out, the jury system

is older than the United States, having been inherited from the British
commonlaw system.

Cases decided by a jury reflect important matters,

such as concerns to the community, disputes over information, or
political and social issues.

Because of its crucial and highly

publicized actions, juries are susceptible to much scrutiny and attack
(Wrightsman, 1978).

For example. Judge Jerome Frank expressed this

view;
It is inconceivable that a body of twelve ordinary men,
casually gathered together for a few days, could, merely,
from listening to the instructions of the judge, gain the
knowledge necessary to grasp the true import of the judge's
words (1949, p. 116).
Trial attorney, F. Lee Bailey, expresses similar pessimism on the
topic.

He writes:

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

A trial by jury, conceived long before there was a United
States as a great equalizer purporting to deliver all
citizens equal justice under law, is in fact a terrifying
experience, riddled with uncertainty and often happenstance
(1978, p. 7).

Criticism of the jury system has stimulated research in many areas
of concern (see Kalven & Zeisel, 1966, chap. 1; Winters, 1971;
Wrightsman, 1978).

Critics argue that the time it takes to process a

jury trial is a major cause of the stupefying backlog of cases
(Rosenblatt, 1972), that jurors often ignore the law and base their
decisions on whim, sympathy, or prejudice (Elwork et al,, 1977), and
that rules designed to instruct jurors on law and procedure are
cumbersome, too technically worded and less-than-understandable to
the average juror, causing arbitrary juridic decisions (Elwork ot al,,
1977, p. 2).
It has been advocated that research in this area should attempt
to test the implicit psychological foundations of the rules of
evidence and procedure (Penrod & Borgida, 1982; Loh, 1981).

Much

of the research thus far has been directed at demonstrating that
certain evidence, procedures or instructions will have certain effects
on lay decision-making.

Little research has focused on what cognitive

factors might mediate these effects.

Derek Bok, President of Harvard

University, recently stated
Scholars have shown little interest in the theories of
cognition that might help decide whether rules of evidence
permit judges to make more accurate decisions or merely

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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accumulate useless data that add to legal expenses and
delays (Bok, 1983, p. 45).
Monahan and Loftus (1982) provide a current review of psychological
research on law and describe three interrelated domains of interest:
(a) operation of the legal system (the way in which cases are
disposed); (b) process factors affecting outcomes in jury trials (juror
and defendant characteristics, evidential factors, eyewitness
testimony or procedural rules); and (c) substantive law.

This latter

domain addresses the validity of assumptions about behavior which are
the basis for law.

Monahan and Loftus (1982) note further that these

assumptions can be "descriptive", such as distinctions between the
legal competencies of children and adults, or "consequential", such as
assumptions about the behavioral effect of criminal sanction.

(For

comprehensive reviews of jury research, see Saks & Hastie, 1978; Nemeth,
1981; Wrightsman, 1978; and Kalven & Zeisel, 1966.)
The present investigation will be concerned with an area of
substantive law, namely, judicial instructions regarding methods of
inference and decision-making jurors are to use when deciding a case.
Jury trials are governed by three types of rules:

(a) the rules of

evidence, (b) the rules of procedure, and (c) the rules of judicial
instruction (Penrod & Borgida, 1982).
the progress of courtroom behavior.

The rules of procedure structure
The rules of evidence are designed

to regulate the presentation of information to jurors.

Jury

instructions inform jurors about the meaning of the law and aid them in
applying it to the facts of the case.

All of these rules have been

designed to increase the probability that jurors will reach a correct

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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verdict.

It is not presumed that jurors are in any way familiar with

the rules; rather, the responsibility of applying them fairly and
accurately rests with the trial judge.

However, it is assumed that

jurors will heed instructions and apply the law as stated.
It is the intent of this work to further the understanding of the
circumstances under which judicial instruction may be ineffective and
may even be damaging to a juror’s ability to apply the law fairly.
Specifically, it will be hypothesized that a judge's instructions to
the jury to disregard certain facts that have been presented in a case
are not only ineffective, but may serve to enhance the jurors' memory
for those facts, thus prejudicing the verdict reached.

The research

to be reviewed here supports the first hypothesis— that is, the
assumption that jurors can ignore evidence when deciding a case is a
weak assumption and ignores psychological theory to a great extent.
The memory variable is one that has not been adequately tested in this
research.

It has been suggested that the instructions may serve to

make inadmissible evidence more salient for jurors and hence available
in memory (Tanford & Penrod, in press; Carretta & Moreland, 1983).
Some variables that have been studied concerning jurors’ responses
to judicial instruction include the language and timing of instructions
(Elwork et al., 1977), the level of severity of the judge’s
admonishment (Wolf & Montgomery, 1977), juror personality variables
(Berg & Vidmar, 1975), different levels of ambiguity in the admissible
evidence (i.e., weak vs. strong) (Sue, Smith, & Caldwell, 1973),
jurors’ felt competence as it relates to attitude change (Wicklund &
Brehm, 1968), the impact of pretrial publicity on decisions

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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(Padawar-Singer & Barton, 1975; Simon, 1967; Sue, Smith, & Gilbert,
1974) and, finally, jurors' integration of evidential and nonevidential
information when determining guilt (Kaplan & Kemraerick, 1974).
Implicit in all of these studies is that many factors affect how
jurors perceive and interpret judicial instruction, as well as how
they use instructions in decision-making.

What has been lacking is

much insight into the cognitive processes that mediate the effects.
While memory is only one cognitive factor involved in the process,
it is one of the most important.
are not allowed to take notes.

It is usually the case that jurors
It is assumed that they can keep all

the facts of the case in their minds, as well as instructions about
which facts to disregard.

It would seem that memory is the juror's

most important and critical tool in deciding cases; thus, it is a
logical place to begin exploring psychological processes that
contribute to the actions and decisions of jurors.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER II
MEMORY AND RECALL

Tanford and Penrod (in press), investigating the effects of
joined trials (more than one offense tried simultaneously) on juror
decisions, found that a defendant was more likely to be convicted on
a particular charge in a joined trial than on the same charge tried
alone.

They also found judges' instructions to consider evidence

separately for each charge to be ineffective in reducing this
conviction rate.

The researchers suggest that a cognitive explanation

for this is that jurors experienced interference effects when trying
to remember material, being unable to separate the evidence for one
charge from the evidence of another when deliberating.
Support for interference effects in long-term memory comes from
research that demonstrates that when subjects learn multiple lists of
word pairs, they make intrusions (confuse words) between lists when
asked to recall them (Postman & Underwood, 1973).

In a more social

context, research on impression formation indicates that specific
information is recalled in relation to an overall impression
(Hamilton, 1981; Hastie, 1981; Hastie & Kumar, 1979).

Berman, Read

and Kenny (1983) found that information consistent with earlier
impressions was more likely to be remembered, and Snyder and
Uranowitz (1978) found that subjects reconstructed events over time
to make them more consistent with earlier impressions.

-7-
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These results all suggest that, in trial proceedings, where jurors
rely on memory, they are likely to experience confusion when reviewing
the facts of the case.

More specifically, a judge's instructions to

disregard certain facts may be ineffective due to a juror's inability
to specifically remember which facts are to be disregarded.

Further,

jurors may organize certain facts to fit existing overall impressions,
ignoring instructions that are dissonant with this organization.
Impression formation research also suggests that negative
information is weighted more heavily than positive (Fiske, 1980;
Hamilton & Huffman, 1971; Hodges, 1974).

Negative trial evidence may

accumulate faster and be more readily recalled than positive facts
during deliberation.
A judge's instructions to disregard particular evidence certainly
carry an implicit negative connotation.

Jurors may weigh whatever they

heard, regardless of its incompleteness, as more negative and more
salient than other positive information.
Supporting this, experiments on belief perseverance Have shown
that people do not disregard information even after it has been completely
discredited (Lord et al., 1979; Ross et al., 1975).

Instructions could

possibly increase this demonstrated prejudice in the court situation,
enhancing jurors' memory for the inadmissible testimony and their
adherence to initial impressions.

Tanford and Penrod (1972), in their

research on the effects of joined trials (more than one offense tried
simultaneously) on jurors' decisions, found that the traditional legal
remedy for possible prejudice in this type of trial (judicial

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

9

instruction) did not reduce conviction tendencies in spite of a strong
and complete set of instructions.

Reactance Theory— The Boomerang Effect
Some researchers have investigated the mechanisms underlying
belief perseverance in jurors.

Notably, Wicklund and Brehm (1968)

applied psychological reactance theory (Brehm, 1966) to the mock juror
paradigm in order to provide empirical support for the theory.
Reactance theory holds that whenever a person's freedom to engage
in various behaviors is eliminated or threatened, that person will be
motivated to restore the freedom that is threatened.

This motivational

state is called "psychological reactance".
According to this theory, when pressured to adopt a strong stand
on one side of a two-sided issue, such as when a judge instructs
jurors to disregard inadmissible evidence, the individual should be
motivated to resist moving toward that stand and to move away from it.
For example, in regard to opinions, a juror should experience
reactance whenever he feels free to adopt or avoid any of several
positions on an issue and is then pressured to adopt a particular one.
The "boomerang" nature of the reactance is seen in not only the
juror's avoidance of adopting the position being forced upon him
(i.e., not to use inadmissible evidence in deliberating), but also
in adhering more strongly to his "threatened" freedom— his original
opinion which may have incorporated the inadmissible evidence.

Wicklund

and Brehm (1968) found this to be the case with subjects who were led
to believe that they were competent to deal with the issue at hand.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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It has been shown that, as a person's felt competence pertaining to an
issue increases, the more reactance he should experience when his
attitudinal freedom is threatened.
It follows that if a juror is reacting to instructions to disregard
certain testimony and moving in an attitudinal direction away from those
instructions, he or she may actually attend to that piece of information
and recall it more easily, more often, and more accurately than evidence
that has been presented without any ruling as to its admissibility.
This might be due to the added time for processing the information that
has been highlighted by the judge's ruling, and the added "reactance"
processing time.
Coupled with findings on impression formation, reactance theory
provides a framework within which to examine memory processes involved
in decision-making.

An impression is both the product and the source

of inferences made about a defendant.

Jurors may initially form an

impression that the defendant has a criminal disposition based on the
fact that he is charged with a crime.

The negative impression then

affects inferences of the likelihood of guilt.

The judgment of guilt

that results from this process is quite résistent to change in response
to judges' instructions, due to psychological reactance.

These theories

suggest that jurors' memory may be selective for those facts that
convey negative information and may also be highly resistant to change,
hence prejudicing decisions.
Findings on memory as a variable in judgments have been
contradictory thus far, with researchers finding in some cases that
memory is related to verdicts (Bordens & Horowitz, 1983), while in some

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

11

it does not seem to have an effect (Tanford & Penrod, 1982; Greene &
Loftus, 1981).

However, only a meager effort has been made in the

investigation of processes involved in subjects' judgments, with all
of the limitations characteristic of much existing research on juror
behavior.
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CHAPTER III
LIMITATIONS OF PREVIOUS RESEARCH

A number of flaws have been noted in the existing body of research
on juror behavior.

For instance, there is still considerable doubt

about which factors mediate the effects that have been found in
experiments with jurors.

The effects have often been demonstrated

with only speculation as to the psychological mediators involved.
Also, although the existing research provides some information about
judgments made by undergraduates responding to questionnaires, it does
not provide substantial insight into the processes in operation for
jurors within the context of an actual jury trial.
The level of complexity inherent in any courtroom trial is
difficult to simulate in the laboratory with undergraduate volunteers.
This accounts for the selection of only certain features of the jury
trial for study rather than staging a complete trial for research
purposes.

For example, the number of days or weeks involved in some

jury trials would preclude exact reenactment in most laboratory
settings.
Monahan and Loftus (1982) have cogently addressed the methodological
issue of laboratory versus field study research.

These authors emphasize

that the primary purpose of the research is what is germane to the
issue.

If the main concern is the prediction of juror behavior in

actual trials, then the external validity assumes a more pressing role
-

12

-
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such that field studies would be the method of choice.

However, when

concerned with theory or the exploration of new variables, internal
validity takes on the major significance and controlled laboratory
studies are best at maximizing control to answer specific questions.
The use of undergraduates as opposed to "real" jurors also affects
the generalizability of results.

This is perhaps the most consistent

and important criticism leveled against jury research.

However, when

college students' judgments were compared with those of actual former
jurors in a recent study by Hinkle et al. (1983), it was found that,
while students were more lenient than the former jurors (i.e., gave
more insane verdicts than guilty verdicts), the pattern of responses
over several measures was very similar.

This suggests that courtroom

experience possibly makes former jurors more conservative.

It also

suggests that the students respond in the same direction as former
jurors and are, hence, not that different in their juridic behavior.
The economic and time considerations in any analogue research
must also be taken seriously in the design of such a study.

Therefore,

while generalizability is compromised to some extent, the important
findings in research with undergraduates may be easily subjected to
another test with actual jurors at a later time, after the initial
question has been answered in a timely, efficient manner.
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CHAPTER IV
JURY INSTRUCTIONS

There are situations in which jurors will be instructed by the
trial judge that they may (or are) obliged to interpret evidence in a
particular way.

In general, instructions to juries are concerned

with the manner in which presumptions are to be made (Penrod & Borgida,
1982); that is, the relationship between a set of basic facts that is
proved in court and a second set of facts, the presumed facts.
If the jury is told it may make a particular inference and told
this by the trial judge, who carries great authority in the courtroom,
it is conceivable that they will make the inference in most, if not
all, situations in which the opportunity arises.

Similarly, when a

judge instructs on inadmissibility, the jurors' attention may be
greater in response to this authoritative message, and this response,
in turn, may plant this information more firmly in their minds.
Questions about presumptions raise important issues about jury
instructions.

In all trials, jurors are instructed about standards of

proof; that is, in criminal cases, jurors are told that the prosecution
must prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

On the

civil side, the plaintiff must prove its case by a preponderance of
the evidence.

Researchers have attempted to discover whether jurors

can understand and make appropriate use of these instructions.
very important question that has been asked is "can jurors obey
— 14—
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instructions informing them that they are to make limited use of
evidence presented?"

Limiting Instructions
A trial judge can offer a compensatory, limiting instruction that
instructs the jury on the appropriate use of certain evidentiary
information (Livermore, 1978).

Limiting instructions are commonly

used in cases where inadmissible evidence has been heard by the jurors,
but the judge does not want them to use this evidence when deciding the
case.

Although it is presumed that jurors can follow these

instructions, there is a great deal of skepticism among researchers
about the effectiveness of limiting instructions.

The Juror's Moral Dilemma
When inadmissible evidence provides necessary and sufficient
information to convince a jury of a defendant's guilt, and such
evidence cannot (or should not) be considered in the rendering of
their verdict, jurors are faced with two uncomfortable choices:
(a) to find the defendant not guilty based on legal rules and release
a criminal, or (b) to decide on a guilty verdict based on evidence
which they have been admonished by the judge to disregard.
This role conflict has been discussed by Radish and Radish
(1971):

If the juror is obliged to do as he is told in the court
instructions and if he may, nevertheless, do as he thinks
best and he in fact is afforded every protection to do as
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he thinks best and his function as a juror is extolled
because jurors sometimes do— how is the conscientious juror
to understand his role?

What is he to do in his jural

role if following the court instructions would lead to a
verdict he is convinced ought to be otherwise? (p. 205)

Judge's Dilemma
When unreliable or illegally-gathered information is presented at
a trial, judges have only two alternatives.

They may declare a mistrial,

an expensive and time-consuming procedure that delays the justice
process, or they may attempt to counteract the biasing impact of
inadmissible evidence by admonishing the jury to ignore it.

Obviously,

evidence cannot be struck as easily from the minds of jurors as it can
from the court record (Kadish & Kadish, 1971).
The research findings on the effectiveness of judges' admonishments
have been equivocal (Saks & Hastie, 1978; Lind, 1982).

For instance,

in the area of the effects of pretrial publicity on juror decision
making, Kline and Jess (1966) and Simon (1967) found that jurors were
apparently able to ignore pretrial publicity when instructed by the
judge.

However, Padawar-Singer and Barton (1975) and Sue, Smith and

Padroza (1975) found that pretrial publicity did affect judgments in
the direction of more guilty verdicts.
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CHAPTER V
INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE AND LIMITING INSTRUCTIONS

Instructions designed to offset the effects of inadmissible
evidence in a trial have been investigated from several different
standpoints, the results presenting a mixed picture.
Sue, Smith, and Caldwell (1973) presented experimental jurors
with either weak or strong evidence against a defendant in a murder
case.

In each condition, subjects were given either additional

evidence ruled admissible, additional evidence ruled inadmissible, or
no additional evidence.

They found that subjects were biased by

inadmissible evidence in the weak condition but not in the strong
condition, indicating that the controversial evidence became quite
salient in jurors' minds when there was insufficient evidence on which
to make a decision.

This occurred in spite of the judge's

admonishments to disregard the inadmissible testimony.
Wolf and Montgomery (1977) carried out a similar study in which
subjects heard critical testimony that was subsequently ruled
admissible, or inadmissible with an admonishment by the judge to
disregard the testimony.

Interestingly, the results indicated that,

when the critical testimony was simply ruled inadmissible, it had
little effect on guilt judgments (subjects did not find the defendant
guilty any more often than subjects in a control group who did not get
the inadmissible ruling).

However, with specific instructions to
-17-
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disregard that testimony, experimental jurors' verdicts were influenced
in the direction of that testimony (they found the defendant guilty
significantly more often than subjects who only heard the inadmissible
ruling).

Subjects in this condition also expressed a greater desire

to be allowed to consider the inadmissible testimony than subjects in
the "inadmissible-without-instructions" condition.

This led the

researchers to interpret the results in terms of psychological
reactance theory (Brehm, 1966).
Wolf and Montgomery (1977) ruled out the effects of salience of
the critical testimony raised by the judge's admonishment as an
alternative explanation of the results.

By including in all experimental

conditions a final charge to the jury mentioning the critical testimony,
they attempted to make the testimony equally available in memory for
all jurors.

This feature of their design does make reactance theory a

more plausible explanation for their results.

However, the design

does not lend itself to an adequate investigation of the role that
memory may have in actual trial proceedings.

When a judge rules on

critical testimony or instructs the jury to disregard certain evidence,
it most commonly occurs during the trial proceedings, embedded in the
context of the evidence that

admissible.

It is unlikely that a

judge would remind the jury of just certain items of evidence or
facts of the case at the end of the trial.
Hence, it is understandable that these researchers were able to
demonstrate a specific phenomenon, psychological reactance, under very
specific circumstances designed to rule out other factors involved in
jury decision-making.

However, under more realistic circumstances,
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it is just as plausible that memory for facts is an important mediator
in how a juror behaves in deciding a case.

A judge’s instructions to

disregard certain facts heard along with a great deal of evidence may
serve to make those facts more salient for jurors when they begin to
review the case as a whole.

While reactance theory may be one

explanation of jurors' apparent failure to follow the judge's
instructions, more work is needed to discern what other factors
contribute to this phenomenon.
In 1981, Thompson, Fong and Rosenhan found that the verdicts of
mock jurors exposed to stricken proacquittal evidence were affected by
the evidence despite limiting instructions, while the verdicts of
jurors who received inadmissible proconviction evidence did not differ
from those of jurors in a control condition.
two forms of judge's instructions:

These researchers used

(a) the judge either emphasized

the importance of strict adherence to procedural quidelines (due
process instructions), or (b) minimized the importance of such
guidelines and instead emphasized the importance of an accurate verdict
(crime control instructions).

This variation was included to address

the different concepts of justice held by the courts and lay people;
due process versus "right" outcomes, respectively.

It was predicted

that inadmissible evidence would have greater influence on jurors who
received the crime control instructions.
No significant effect was found for the variation in the judge's
instructions nor did this factor interact with any of the other
variables.

This finding is particularly interesting because it is a

more drastic variation than would ever occur in a real court.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

By legal

20

standards, the crime control instructions would be considered extremely
prejudicial.

Although the reasons for this finding were not explored,

it suggests strongly that jurors tend to decide cases according to
their own standards of justice and may not be influenced by what a judge
says.

Again, the mechanisms of the jurors* behavior were not

investigated here, but the findings are consistent with research that
begs for a closer look at these mechanisms.
Doob and Kirschenbaum (1972) and Hans and Doob (1976) found that
instructions designed to limit juror use of prior conviction evidence
was ineffectual; jurors who heard the prior record evidence were more
likely to convict.
One factor that may constrain the effectiveness of compensatory
limiting instructions is that standard jury instructions are
characteristically overburdened with jargon and difficult to
comprehend, let alone use appropriately (Danet, 1980).

Charrow and

Charrow (1979), for example, randomly selected qualified jurors and
asked them to listen to audiotaped judicial instructions in a civil
trial.

Using a recall technique, the researchers found that the juror

paraphrasing of instructions included only about one-third of the
linguistic units in the original instructions.
Elwork, Sales and Alfini (1977) also have shown that comprehensibility
of judicial instructions may be a factor in their appropriate use.

More

recently (1982), they found that prior to jury deliberations in a
criminal trial, the average juror may comprehend only half of the judge's
instructions.

However, it has been shown that the application of
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linguistic principles to jury instructions to clarify meaning can
improve juror understanding (Severance S Loftus, 1982).

Timing of Instructions
Another factor that may limit the effectiveness of instructions is
the way they are presented during the proceedings.

The traditional

practice has been to present them at the end of the trial.

Although

preliminary instructions have been used occasionally, there is a
concern that this may affect juror decision-making by over-emphasizing
the issues raised in such instructions (Penrod & Borgida, 1982).
Concerns over timing are not unprecedented.

Over 20 years ago,

for example, in arguing for the use of preliminary trial instructions.
Judge Prettyman (1960) questioned a juror's ability to
...

go back over a stream of conflicting statements of

alleged facts, recall the intonation, the demeanor, or even
the existence of the witnesses, and retrospectively sift all
these recollections into a pattern of evaluation and judgment
given him for the first time after the event. . . .

The

fact of the matter is that this order of procedure makes
much of a trial or a lawsuit mere mumbo-jumbo (p. 1066).
Similarly, Sales et al. (1977) argued that it is unreasonable to
expect jurors to recall and evaluate all of the appropriate evidence
after the judicial instructions are explained at the end of the trial.
A study by Kassin and Wrightsraan (1979) provides further support
for the importance of the timing of instructions.

College student

jurors watched the videotaped reenactment of a case in which the
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defendant was charged with stealing a car and transporting it across
state lines.

Judicial instruction on the requirements of proof were

included either at the end of the trial or before the evidence was
presented.

A third control group did not receive the traditional

instructions.

Kassin and Wrightsman (1979) found that jurors who

received instructions before the evidence were less likely to convict
the defendant than jurors who received no instructions, whereas jurors
who received the instructions after the trial did not differ in their
verdicts from the jurors who received no instructions.

Although

recall of case related facts was high for all jurors, jurors who
received instructions after the trial demonstrated poorer recall than
jurors who were preinstructed.

Direct vs. Indirect Effects of Inadmissible Evidence
The available research clearly suggests that evidence that has
been ruled inadmissible by a judge can have an important influence on
jurors' reactions toward a defendant.
In a recent study (1983), Carretta and Moreland explored the
"indirect" effects of inadmissible evidence.

They defined "indirect

effects" as being either "intrapersonal"— changes in individual information
processing— or "interpersonal"— changes in how jury members talk about
a case to one another during deliberations.

Direct effects relate to

the outcome of juridic decisions, that is, either guilt or innocense.
In their study, Carretta and Moreland (1983) presented a summary
of a murder trial to college students acting as jurors.

The strength

of the case against the defendant was manipulated, as was the inclusion
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of wiretapping evidence that favored either the prosecution or the
defense and was ruled either admissible or inadmissible by the judge.
Direct effects of inadmissible evidence on subjects' reactions toward
the defendant were investigated before and after their group discussions.
The subjects' behavior

during these discussions was observed in order

to investigate the indirect effects

of inadmissible evidence.

Whether it favored the prosecution or the defense, inadmissible
evidence directly biased subjects' reactions toward the defendant and
indirectly biased their behavior during group discussions.

The results

also showed that the direct effects of inadmissible evidence were at
least partially mediated by its indirect effects.

More specifically,

Carretta and Moreland (1983) found that the discussion served to either
strengthen or weaken the direct effects of inadmissible evidence on a
group's decision.

During the discussions, the inadmissible evidence

was always a relatively salient topic.

Whenever one group member

mentioned inadmissible

evidence during a discussion however, another

member often responded

by reminding the group about the judge's ruling.

This phenomenon occurred about 56 percent of the time among groups that
received any condition in which the wiretapping evidence was
inadmissible.

The researchers concluded that the subjects

"monitored" one another during the group discussions so as to minimize
any possible effects of inadmissible evidence on their decisions.
This study indicates that inadmissible evidence is a salient part
of the information that jurors use when deciding a case.

The direct

effects of this salience may vary with both intrapersonal and
interpersonal characteristics of jurors, as well as whether the
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inadmissible evidence favors the prosecution or the defense, and a
host of other considerations mentioned in this literature review.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION AND HYPOTHESIS

James Marshall (1966) concluded his book by stating:
In a civilization so largely founded on scientific method,
and in which daily living is so dependent upon the
application of scientific findings, the theory and
practice of law remain largely immune to this prevailing
pattern (p. 103).
On the basis of research findings in this area, it is reasonable
to question the ability of jurors to heed judicial instructions which
admonish them to disregard inadmissible evidence when they make their
juridic decisions.

The issue is infused with significant implications

for our present system of justice, not the least of which is the fact
that often irreversible decisions are made about the lives of
individuals within this system.
It was the intent of this project to explore memory factors in
jury decision-making and how memory may be affected by judicial
instruction.
Based on previous research pertaining to the behavior of jurors
as well as our understanding of certain cognitive factors involved in
memory and recall, the research hypothesis tested is as follows:
It is predicted that experimental jurors instructed to
ignore inadmissible evidence will recall that piece of
-25-

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

evidence, regardless of its incompleteness, more
frequently and more accurately than subjects not receiving
the judicial admonishment but exposed to the same set of
basic facts.
In addition, it is predicted that important
relationships might be found between memory for facts and
trial outcome.
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CHAPTER VII
SIGNIFICANCE AND CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE PROJECT

The results of this project are intended to add information to a
growing body of research which calls for the revision of our jury
system as it now operates.
The criticisms of this area of social science research are
widespread.

In addressing this criticism (see Chapter I), an attempt

is being made to go beyond superficial cause-effect research to
investigate underlying cognitive processes that may contribute to
jurors' decisions.

The major criticism pertains to the questionable

generalizability of psychological research to the "real-world" judicial
process.

This criticism is attended to here by a review of past

related research.

This project is designed to be as similar as possible

to the actual jury trial.

The use of a civil case that was previously

tried in local courts and a videotaped presentation to the experimental
jurors place this research in a small category of projects of this type
in terms of external validity and "true-to-life" conditions.
Since jurors are not allowed to take notes during proceedings (in
most cases), it is felt that their reliance on memory is great.

It is,

in fact, a most important factor in deciding which facts of the case
determine the outcome of a trial.

It follows that an empirical

investigation of the conditions under which jurors remember (or forget)
certain facts is both needed and important to the legal community and
-27-
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researchers in this area.

Considerations of modifications in our

existing system may need to rest on the kind of information in this
study, gathered in an empirical, scientific way.
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CHAPTER VIII
METHOD

Sub1ects
One hundred and twenty male and female subjects (40 per group)
were recruited from undergraduate classes during the 8-week summer
session at the University of Montana.

Subjects were allowed to sign

up for one hour afternoon or evening experimental sessions held at the
Clinical Psychology Center.

Characteristics of the subject sample

appear in Table 1.

Experimental Design
The proposed project employed a Between Groups Randomized design
(Kazdin, 1978), with post-test measurements only.

The subjects were

randomly assigned to one of three groups, with males and females being
approximately equally balanced.

Experimental Group One heard and saw

testimony that included the introduction of inadmissible evidence, a
ruling by the judge on inadmissibility and the judge's admonishment to
the jury to disregard that evidence.

Experimental Group Two heard and

saw the same testimony with the judge's ruling on inadmissibility, but
with rm instructions to jurors to disregard it.

Group Three (control)

heard the same case, with no rulings on inadmissibility and no
instructions by the judge.
independent variables were:

The design is depicted in Table 2.

The

(a) the judge's ruling of inadmissibility-

-29-
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Table 1

Subject Characteristics (N = 120, M = 49, F = 71) (40 per group)

Age

Prior
Jury
Member

Year in
College

Range

18-54

1-5*

X

28.13

3.2

.15

3.03

1.4

.36

SD

1 = Yes
2 = No

*5 = graduate student or "other"

Table 2
Experimental Design

Stimulus Materials

Group One

Group Two

Group Three

*

Written Case Summary
Videotaped Presentation

■j;-

■ÎC-

Inadmissibility Ruling
Judge's Instructions to Disregard

*

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

'il

present or absent, and, (b) the judge's instructions to disregard the
inadmissible evidence— present or absent.

Materials
Each subject received a booklet containing a summary of the case
and instructions on their role as experimental jurors (Appendix A).
The case used was adapted from a civil case heard in Missoula County
in 1979— Plovhar (Plaintiffs) vs. Board of Trustees of Missoula County
High School (Defendant).

Videotaped presentations were prepared with

the help of student-actors and were based on the testimony of Arlyn
Simms, a supervisor at the Vocational-Technical Center at the time of
the accident.

A summary of the transcript of his testimony is

contained in Appendix B.

Verbatim transcripts, being too lengthy to

include in the appendix, are available from the researcher on request.
All last names of the people involved in this case have been changed in
order to protect their privacy.

Procedure
Subjects signed up during summer quarter, 1985, for specified one
to one-and-a-half hour experimental sessions.

The particular

videotaped version shown at any session was randomly selected,
independent of the selection of subjects.
Subjects arriving at the experimental site were greeted by the
experimenter.

Subjects were assigned to seats in a small classroom

and told that they were to be serving as experimental jurors in a
reconstruction of an actual civil trial.

It was stressed that they
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must approach the task as if they were the actual Jurors, hearing the
case for the first time, with important consequences attached to their
decisions.
Subjects were then given a booklet containing a summary of the
case being presented, an introduction to the videotaped segment of the
trial and further instructions pertaining to their role as experimental
jurors (see Appendix A).

Ten minutes was allowed for subjects to read

the summary and the experimenter then asked if everyone understood the
instructions.

If there were no questions, one of the three videotaped

versions of the trial was shown (see Appendix B for a synposis of the
contents of the videotapes).
After viewing the videotape, subjects' summary booklets were
collected and they received another booklet containing the dependent
measures.

The dependent measures consisted of two questionnaires.

The

first questionnaire contained multiple choice items assessing the
subjects' memory for facts in the case.

Each item had four answer

choices (a through d) and a confidence rating in the form of a Likert
scale as a manipulation check (1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 - S - 9 - 10).
Not at all
Completely
Confident
Confident
The questions pertain to the overall factual material with questions
embedded in the whole measure regarding the inadmissible testimony
(questions numbered 3, 12, 13, and 15).

The second questionnaire asked

for demographic characteristics and the subjects' determination of the
outcome of the case (i.e., negligent vs. not negligent), as well as
the amount of award recomended and which facts in the case were most
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important in reaching

their decision.

contained in Appendix

C.)

Subjects wishing

(Dependent Measures are

to be debriefed about the study were notified

of the date and time when such information would be made available.
Subjects were then thanked and dismissed.

Data Analysis
Y
The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences— Ten (SPSS' ) was
used to compute one-way analyses of variance for the dependent measure
items containing a Likert-type scale (choices = 1 to 10).

These items

were questions numbered 4, 5, and 6 on the demographic measure and
confidence ratings for critical items 3, 12, 13, and 15 on the multiplechoice questionnaire (Appendix C) for each group.

Scheffe’s test was

employed in this statistical package to determine which groups
differed when all possible contrasts were made.
For the dichotomous case-outcome question (negligent vs. not
negligent) a cbi square test was performed and cross-tabulations of
this same item were generated for the variables sex, age and
experimental condition.
The multiple-choice memory scale was also analyzed as a
dichotomous measure (correct vs. incorrect) and a chi square
procedure used.

When significant differences resulted among groups

on these items, the Bonferroni significant difference test (BSD) for
comparisons among individual cells was applied to adjust for Type I
errors after multiple comparisons were made for all groups.
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Item number 7 was examined for trends and information pertaining
to the information that subjects felt was important to them in
deciding the case.

No statistical test was used with this item.
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CHAPTER IX
RESULTS

Negligent vs. Mot Negligent Decision
Table 3 depicts the percentage of subjects who indicated that
Missoula County was either "Negligent" or "Not Negligent" in the death
of Patrick Pullman.

The table is broken down by sex.

No significant
2

differences were found for males and females on this item ( iL = 3.07,
df = 1 , 2 . ^

.05).

Sixty-one percent of the female subjects and 78

percent of the male subjects endorsed the "not negligent" verdict for
Missoula County.

Thirty-nine percent of the females and 22 percent of

the males chose the "negligent" verdict.
Table 4 contains the case outcome variable broken down by
experimental condition. There were no significant differences found
2
among groups (TC ^ .68, ^ = 2, £ > .05). Seventy percent of the
subjects in Group One, 70 percent of the subjects in Group Two and
63 percent of the subjects in Group Three found Missoula County "not
negligent".

Thirty percent of Group One subjects, 30 percent of

Group Two subjects and 37 percent of Group Three subjects indicated
that Missoula County was "negligent".
The case outcome item was also analyzed for differences based on
the age of the experimental jurors and no significant differences were
found (X^ = 34.02, ^

= 29, £ > .05) for this variable.

-35-
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Table 3

Case Outcome By Sex

Males

Females

Total

Not Negligent

78% (n = 38)

61% (n = 43)

67.3%

Negligent

22% (n = 11)

39% (n = 28)

32.5%

41% (n = 49)

59% (n = 71)

100.0%

Total %

Table 4
Case Outcome by Experimental Group

Group One

Group Three

Group Two

Not Negligent

70% (n = 28)

70% (n = 28)

63% (n = 25)

Negligent

30% (n = 12)

30% (n = 12)

37% (n = 15)
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Degree of Negligence

Subjects were asked to rate the degree of negligence shown by the
Missoula County Technical Center on a 10-point Likert-type scale (1 =
"definitely negligent" to 10 = "definitely not negligent").

An analysis

of variance (item by condition) revealed no significant differences
among groups on this rating.

Table 5 depicts the anova.

The mean

rating for all subjects in the sample on this scale was 6.64, standard
deviation was 3.1, indicating an overall rating on the item in the
direction of "definitely not negligent".

Decision Confidence
Subjects rated their confidence in their decision regarding
negligence on a 10-point Likert-type scale from 1 = "completely
confident" to 10 = "not at all confident".
variance was performed on these data.

A one-way analysis of

No significant differences

were found among groups (see Table 6).

The mean rating for all subjects

in the sample on this decision-confidence item was 2.71, standard
deviation = 1.81.

This group mean reflects a rating on this item in

the direction of "completely confident".

Award Recommendation
Subjects were asked to rate on a 10-point scale from 1 = "no
award" to 10 = "the highest award possible" what amount of award they
would recommend for the plaintiff (family of Pat Pullman).

An anova

resulted in no significant differences among groups for award
recommendation (see Table 7).

The mean rating on this item for all
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Table 5

Degree of Negligence by Group/Anova

Source

df

Sum of
Squares

Mean
Squares

2

27.2667

13.6333

Within Groups

117

1148.3250

9.8147

Total

119

1175.5917

Between Groups

I

2

1.389

0.2534

Table 6

by

Group/Anova

df

Sum of
Squares

Mean
Squares

2

2.8167

1.4083

Within Groups

117

387.5500

3.3124

Total

119

390.3667

Decision Confidence

Source

Between Groups

p

0.425
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2
0.6547

Table 7

Award by Group/Anova

ÉL

Sum of
Squares

Mean
Squares

2

0.0167

0.0083

Within Groups

117

924.3500

7.9004

Total

119

924.3667

Source

Between Groups

F

0.001
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R
0.9989

àn

subjects in the sample was 3.78 and the standard deviation was 2.78,
indicating a general recommendation in the direction of "no award".

Statement Regarding Important Evidence
Subjects were asked to briefly state which pieces of evidence or
information were most important for them in making their own decisions
about the case.

While these subjective reports were not statistically

analyzed. Table 8 summarizes responses given by those subjects who
responded to this item clearly;

that is, subjects whose comments

paralleled their verdict.

Memory Scale
Critical Items.

Subjects answered 20 multiple-choice questions

about facts in the case presentation.

Within the twenty questions,

four "critical items" (questions numbered 3, 12, 13, and 15) were
embedded which pertained to the inadmissible testimony that subjects
heard (Group One = heard it, heard judge's ruling, and was admonished
to disregard it; Group Two = heard it and heard judge's ruling; Group
Three = heard the testimony without rulings or instructions).
The critical items were collapsed to obtain a composite score for
each group.

There were no significant differences among groups on this

composite score (see Table 9).

Mean scores and standard deviations for

each group are shown in Table 10.
Individually, a chi square test of each critical item resulted in
9
significant differences among groups for item number 13 (9C ~ 17.46,
7
d f = 2, 2. "01), the confidence rating on item number 13 (7^- = 27.36,
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Table 8
Summary of Responses Regarding Important Evidence

Response

Approximate Number Who
Responded

Verdict = NEGLIGENT
The reference to Simons' deposition in which he said
that it was the instructors' responsibility to
supervise students and to assign partners

11

Not enough supervisors on the job site . . .
ratio 2:20 not adequate for safety

9

Simons "should" have assigned Pat a partner when he
left him at the job site.

5

Lack of back-up warning light on the Cat that backed
over Pat

4

Pullman family deserved to get money to compensate
for the loss of a son

3

Too much equipment on the small job site for so many
students

2

Pat was a very good (careful) student

2

Students had very little experience with this equipment
compared to the instructors (i.e., Marty should not
have been on the Cat alone)

2

If Simons was able to see a grade stake while
looking back from the Cat, then Marty (the driver)
should have been able to see a full-sized man

1

Verdict = NOT NEGLIGENT
Emphasis on safety in the boys' training

19

Students had had several months experience with the
machinery

9

The Cat was g o in g back and forth in a regular pattern,
making a discernible noise

9
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Table 8 (continued)

Summary of Responses Regarding Important Evidence

Approximate Number Who
Responded

Response

Verdict = NOT NEGLIGENT (continued)
Instructors were busy when

theaccident occurred

2

Pat was a "perfectionist"

3

It was the students' own responsibility to be
cautious

4

Pat was "careless" or "in the wrong place at the
wrong time"

6

There was a proper ratio of instructors to students
for supervision

2

The family could not prove"negligence"

1

Dangerous work-instructors couldn't watch all
students at all times

2

Pat failed to advise the Cat operator that he was
working behind him

1
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Table 9

Composite Score of Critical Items by Group/Anova

Sum of
Squares

Source

Between Groups

Mean
Squares

2

3.4667

1.7333

Within Groups

117

133.5250

1.1412

Total

119

136.9917

F

1.519

2

0.223

Table 10
Means and Standard Deviations of Groups on Composite Score of Critical
Items

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Group One

2.4250

1.0350

Group Two

2.3250

1.1410

Group Three

2.0250

1.0250

Total

2.2583

1.0729

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

df = 14, 2 < .01), and item number 15 (
(see Tables 11, 12, and 13).

= 8.75,

= 2, 2 ^ .01)

There were no significant differences among

groups for the remaining critical items (3 and 12) (see Tables 14 and 15).
Multiple Comparisons for Significant Critical Items.

Pairwise

comparisons of the significant critical items among the three conditions
employed revealed that, on item number 13, the subjects who were exposed
to all of the objections, rulings, and instructions (Group One) answered
this item correctly significantly more often than the subjects who heard
no objections, rulings or instructions (Group Three) (lO' = 6.76, ^

= 1,

2 < .05), but did not differ significantly from subjects who heard just
the rulings (Group Two) (OC ^ = 2.49, ^

= 1, 2 > .05).

In addition,

Group Two answered this item correctly significantly more often than
Group Three

= 15.57, ^

= 1, 2 < .05).

Tables 16, 17, and 18 display

the number of subjects in each condition answering either incorrectly
or correctly to this item.

The more the subjects heard about the

particular point that item number 13 pertained to, the more frequently
they chose the correct answer to this critical item.
The confidence rating for item number 13 was subjected to a
multiple comparison as well.

It was found that all groups differed from
2
each other significantly, with Groups One and Two differing most ( X
=
2
18.56, df = 7,
< .05), followed by Groups Two and Three
= 15.93,
9

df = 7, 2 ^ .05) with Groups One and Three differing least ("XdT = 7,

< .05).

= 6.16,

Tables 19, 20, and 21 contain the contingency tables

for each comparison.
portrayed in Table 22.
confidence indicated.

Mean scores on the 10-point Likert scale are
The higher the score, the greater the
The group who heard all variables
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Table 11
Critical Item #13 Cross-Classification by Condition and X ~

Group One

Group Two

Group Three

INCORRECT (25.2:)

Count

8

3

19

Row Percent

26.7

10.0

63.3

Column Percent

20.0

7.7

47.5

CORRECT (74.S:)

Count

32

36

21

Row Percent

36.0

40.4

23.6

Column Percent

80.0

92.3

52.5

= 17.46388, df = 2, j&= .0002
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Table 12
Likert Scale Confidence Ratina #13 Cross-Classification by
Condition and X.

Group One

Group Two

1 = Mot at all Confident

0

0

0

2

0

0

0

Group Three

3

r"'
50.0"*
2.5***

0
0
0

1
50.0
2.5

4

3
42.9
7.5

0
0
0

4
57.1
10.0

5

2
25.0
5.0

6

1
20.0
2.5

0
0
0

7

5
62.5
12.8
0
0
0

1
12.5
2.5
4
80.0
10.0

6
75.0
15.4

2
25.0
5.0

8

1
10.0
2.5

6
60.0
15.4

3
30.0
7.5

9

3
33.3
7.5

6
44.4
10.3

3
22.2
5.0

10 = Completely Confident

29
41.4
72.5

18
25.7
46.2

23
32.9
57.5

lO- = 27.35732, ^

= 14, _p = .0173

= count
= row percent
= column percent
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Table 13
Critical Item #15 Cross-Classification by Condition and

Group One

Group Two

Group Three

INCORRECT (30.3")

Count
Row Percent
Column Percent
CORRECT

11
29.7
27.5

19
51.4
47.5

7
18.9
17.5

29
34.9
72.5

21
25.3
52.5

33
39.8
82.5

(69.2%)

Count
Row Percent
Column Percent
7L“ = 8.75285, df_ = 2, 2 = 0.0126

Table 14
9
Critical Item #3 Cross--Classification by Condition and OC"

Group One

INCORRECT

Group Three

(59.8%)

Count
Row Percent
Column Percent
CORRECT

Group Two

20
28.6
54.1

21
30.0
52.5

29
41.4
72.5

17
36.2
45.9

19
40.4
47.5

11
23.4
27.5

(40.2%)

Count
Row Percent
Column Percent

y j = 4.07953, df = 2, £ = 0.1301
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Table 15

Critical Item #12 Cross-Classification by Condition and

Group One

INCORRECT

Group Three

(56.3%)

Count
Row Percent
Column Percent
CORRECT

Group Two

21
31.3
52.5

23
34.3
57.5

23
34.3
59.0

19
36.5
47.5

17
32.7
42.5

16
30.8
41.0

(43.7%)

Count
Row Percent
Column Percent
X " = 0.37156, ^ = 2 , 2

= 0.8305

Table 16
Comparison of Group One to Group Three on Item #13

INCORRECT

Group Three

8

19

32

21

(33.8%)

Count
CORRECT

Group One

(66.3%)

Count
= 6,76450, ^

= 1, 2. ' .01 (per Bonferroni)
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Table 17

Comparison of Group One to Group Two on Item #13

INCORRECT

Group Two

8

3

32

36

(13.9%)

Count
CORRECT

Group One

(86.1%)

Count

y ? = 2.49576, ^

= 1,

> .05 (per Bonferroni)

Table 18

Comparison of Group Two to Group Three on Item #13

Group One

Group Two

3

19

36

21

INCORRECT (27.8%)
Count
CORRECT (72.2%)
Count

y j = 15.57357, df = 1, 2 < .01 (per Bonferroni)
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Table 19

Comparison of Groups One and Two on the Confidence rating for I^em #13

Group One

Group Two

1 = Not at all Confident

1

0

2

0

0

3

1

0

4

3

0

5

2

5

6

1

0

7

0

6

8

1

6

9

3

4

29

18

10 = Completely Confident

= 18.56478, d_f = 7, 2 < .05 (per Bonferroni)
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Table 20
Comparison of Groups Two and Three on the Confidence
Rating for Item #13

Group Two

Not at all Confident

Group Three

0

0

2

0

0

3

0

1

4

0

4

5

5

1

6

0

4

7

6

2

8

6

3

9

4

2

18

23

10 = Completely Confident

X-

= 15.93298, dT = 7, 2 ' .05 (per Bonferroni)
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Table 21
Comparison of Groups One and Three on the Confidence
Rating for Item #13

Group One

Group Three

1 = Not at all Confident

0

0

2

0

0

3

1

1

4

3

4

5

n

1

6

1

4

7

0

2

8

]

3

9

3

9

29

23

10 = Completely Confident

X ? = 6.16850, dT = 7, 2

*01 (per Bonferroni)

Table 22

Means and Standard Deviations for each Group on Subiects' 10-point
Likert Scale Ratings of Confidence on Item #13

Mean

Standard Deviation

Group One

8.97

2.15

Group Two

8.48

1.76

Group Three

8.35

2. 2^
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3

i

in the tape (Group One) reported the greatest confidence in the
correctness of their answer.
On item number 15, the multiple comparisons resulted in a
9
significant difference between Groups Two and Three only (
= 8.20,
df = 1, 2. < .01). There were no significant differences for Groups
7
One and Two (TC = 3.41, df = 1, 2.
*05) nor between Groups One and
Three ("X.^ = 1.14,

= 1, 2

Non-Critical Items.

-05) (see Tables 23, 24, and 25).

Of the remaining sixteen items on the multiple

choice memory scale, significant differences were found among groups
for item numbers 6, 16, 17, and 18;
2

.01), item 16 (K^ = 9.45,

df = 2, 2

=

item 6( X ^ = 15.75, df = 2,
2, 2 - *01), item 17 (7C^ = 11.18,

.01), item 18 (K.^ = 7.36,

for crosstabulations and

= 2, 2 ^ .05) (see Table 26

chi squares; Table 27 for means and standard

deviations of groups on these items).
Confidence Ratings on Memory Scale Items.

No significant

differences were found among groups for the Likert scale confidence
ratings on this dependent measure with the exception of item number 13,
as previously noted (p. 40).

Means

confidence ratings for all subjects

and standard deviations for all
in the sample appear in Table 28.

Other Results
Table 29 contains the mean number of correct responses for each
multiple-choice item on the memory scale for all subjects.
Table 30 contains chi squared values for all multiple-choice items
that were not significant and that were not mentioned previously in
this chapter.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

54
Table 23
Comparison of Group Two to Group Three on Item #15

Group Two

Group Three

INCORRECT (32.5%)

19

7

CORRECT (67.5%)

21

33

*X-“ = 8.20513, df = 1 , 2

'05 (per Bonferroni)

Table 24
Comparison of Group One to Group Two on Item #15

Group One

Group Two

INCORRECT (37.5%)

11

19

CORRECT (62.5%)

29

21

= 3.41333,

= 1,

> .05 (per Bonferroni)

Table 25

Comparison of Group One and Group Three on Item #15

Group One

Group Three

INCORRECT (22.5%)

11

7

CORRECT (77.5%)

29

33

= 1.14695, df_ = 1, 2 > .05 (per Bonferroni)
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Table 26
and Cross-Classification bv Condition of Non-Critical Items that
attained Significance on the Multiple-Choice Memory Measure

Group One

Group Two

Group Three

Item 5”
INCORRECT (76.7%)

Count
Row Percent
Column Percent

35
38.0
87.5

22
23.9
55.0

35
38.0
87.5

5
17.5
12.5

18
64.3
45.0

5
17.9
12.5

CORRECT (23.3%)

Count
Row Percent
Column Percent
Item 16
INCORRECT (10.2%)

Count
Row Percent
Column Percent

8
0Ô.7
21.1

0
0
0

4
33.3
10.0

30
28.3
78.9

40
37.;
100.0

36
34.0
90.0

16
59.3
40.0

7
25.9
17.5

4
14.8
10.0

24
35.5
60.0

33
35.5
82.5

30

CORRECT (99.8%)

Count
Row Percent
Column Percent
Item 17
INCORRECT (22.5%)

Count
Row Percent
Column Percent
COPRECT (77.5%^

Count
Row Percent
Column Percent
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38.7
90.0

Table 26

(continued)

9

X " and Cross-Classification by Condition of Non-Critical Items that
attained Significance on the ;iultinlc-Cboice Oenorv Peasur e

Group One

Group Two

Group Three

Item Ic ...
INC0RR2CT (5.0:^)

Count
Row Percent
Column Percent

1
15.7
2.5

0
0
0

5
33.3
12.5

39
34.2
97.5

40
35.1
100.0

35
30.7
S7.5

CORRECT (05.0%)

Count
Row Percent
Column Percent

" X r = 15.74534, ^

= 2, 2 = .0004

= 0.45641, ^

= 2, 2 = .0088

= 11.13230, _df = 2, 2. = .0037

'yj- = 7.36C42, df = 2, £ = .0251
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Table 27

Means and Standard Deviations for Groups on Items #6, #16, #17, #18

Group One

X

Item

SD

Group Two

X

SD

Group Three

X

SD

.12

.33

.45

.50

.12

.33

Item 16

.78

.41

1.00

0.00

.90

.30

Item 17

.60

.49

.82

.38

.90

.30

Item 13

.97

.16

1.00

0.00

.87

.33

6

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Table 23
Means and Standard Deviations for all subjects on Confidence Rating;

Item Number

Mean

Standard Deviation

1
'1

9.44
9.45
9.39
7.49 .65
1.59
9.53
9.27
8.15
8.29
S. 59
3.25
6.53
8.55
8.79
9.07
8.69
9.46
9.00
7.95

1.19
1.60
1.69
3.00
1.10
1.78
1.16
1.63
2 .08
2.49
1.37
1.95
2.08
2.30
2.12
2.07
2.07
1.55
1.92
o _^2

.J
/■,
5
6
7
.

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
15
17
r19
2'j

Table 29
Means for all Subjects' Responses to the Memory Scale (Number
'.'ho Answered Correctly )

Item Number

Mean

Item Number

Mean

1

.31
.87
.40
.59
.94
.23
.93
.91
.55
.83

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

.33
.43
.74
.33
.69
.69
.73
.95
.82
.71

n

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
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Table 30

Values for Non-Significant Multiple-Choice Items

Item Number

1
2
4
5
7
3
9
10
11
14
19
20

-XL?

dT

.11
.52
2.21
4.05
4.23
2.34
.23
.66
5.16
.34
.36
5.01

2
0
0

significance

.-'*4
.77
.32

9
9

2
2
2
9

2
2
2
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.09
.24
.39
.72
.OF
.66
.33
.03

CHAPTER X
DISCUSSION

Results obtained from this study presented a mixed and somewhat
confusing picture of the area of juror behavior being investigated.
Memory is a complex process which is not well-understood.

The

multiplicity of factors known to effect the storage and retrieval of
information and the variables that can intervene to distort, enhance
or cause mistakes in recall make the measurement of it particularly
difficult.

Therefore, it is necessary to consider not only the

effects of the independent variable in this study on the memory process,
but also the possible effects of other variables which may have
influenced the recall of information.

While the research hypothesis

proposed here was not confirmed by the results, several significant
differences and important findings stand out and suggest further
methodological refinements and future directions for jury research.
The present study examined memory as a variable in juror behavior,
where inadmissible evidence and judicial instruction were varied as
factors.

Some support was found for the hypothesis that a juror's

memory for inadmissible evidence would be enhanced by a judge's ruling
and instructing jurors to disregard that evidence.

Specifically, on

one of the four critical questions pertaining to inadmissible testimony
(item number 13), jurors who had heard the judge's ruling on
inadmissibility and had been instructed to disregard it, answered the
—60—
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question pertaining to that piece of evidence correctly

significantly

more often than jurors who heard no ruling or intruction.

Jurors who

heard the inadmissibility ruling with no instruction to disregard the
evidence also answered the question correctly significantly more

often

than those who heard the testimony but heard no ruling or instruction.
In addition, the jurors who heard the judge's ruling and were instructed
to disregard the evidence expressed significantly greater confidence
in the correctness of their response to this item.
This finding, while supporting the prediction of the researcher,
was mitigated by the fact that on the remaining three critical items
pertaining to inadmissible testimony, significant differences were not
found for two items and a significant difference on the remaining item
was found in a direction not predicted by the research hypothesis.
The second critical item that obtained significance pertained to
whether or not the witness felt that the presence of a back-up alarm on
the piece of equipment that ran over the deceased would have made any
difference in the accident happening (see item number 15, Appendix C).
In this case, jurors who heard the testimony without any ruling or
instruction from the judge answered the question correctly significantly
more often than jurors who heard the judge's ruling but did not differ
significantly from jurors who heard both the ruling and instructions
to disregard.
The wording of this item was examined for semantic flaws and it
was determined that it was clearly written.

However, a review of

those juror's responses who answered the item incorrectly revealed
that a large percentage of them chose answer "d", "he did not testify
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on this point", rather than the correct answer, "b", "no".

It is

possible that jurors who had been instructed to disregard chat
inadmissible evidence (Group One) intentionally answered incorrectly
in order to follow the instructions given to them that they act as
much as possible like "real" jurors while participating in the studv.
This explanation would not extend to the jurors who heard the
evidence ruled inadmissible but received no instruction to disregard
it.

This group differed significantly from the group who heard no

rulings or instructions by answering correctly less often.
It may well be that jurors in both experimmental Groups One and
Two experienced what Tanford and Penrod (in press) referred to as
"interference effects" in their research on joined trials.

They found

that there was a higher conviction rate for defendants who were tried
on more than one offense simultaneously than when each offense was
tried alone.

They explained the higher rate of conviction by suggesting

that jurors became confused when trying to recall and separate the
evidentiary facts about each case in the joined trial.

Possibly the

subjects in the present study were similarly confused when trying to
recall the answers to critical items that pertained to material in
the case that had been objected to, ruled on and/or that they had been
instructed to disregard.

Judicial rulings and instructions may have

served to confuse rather than enhance memory for the critical facts.
Future research on this point might include a correlational design
using multiple memory measures.

In this way, confusion or interference

in the memory process might be more evident and more easily assessed
as an actual event happening during the retrieval stage.
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As Loftus and her colleagues (1980) have shown in a series of
studies, distortions in stored memory can result from subsequent
information and events.

They also found that nonexistent events can be

incorporated into people's memories and that the way a question is
phrased may influence stored memory.

Loftus used this evidence of the

changeable nature of stored memory to support a "reconstructive"
model of memory, which involves a difference in information that is
recalled from the initially-stored memory.

Clearly, memory is an

active process that can be influenced by multiple intervening variables
from the time of storage to the time of retrieval.

In this study,

variables that may have intervened to effect recall are the judge's
instructions, wording of the dependent measure items, subsequent
information in the case presentation, personal feelings of the jurors
regarding the actors or the situation in the case, or any number of
other subjective variables that would be difficult to measure.
In this study, memory is the process being measured; however,
since its nature is active and changeable, it is impossible to assess
with one discrete measure.

It appears that more in-depth work is

needed in this area to determine how multiple factors interact to
affect memory and how these factors might be controlled in the
courtroom setting.

It has been suggested that videotaped trial

presentations might provide a means to curtail problems inherent in
jurors' ability to heed judges' counsel (Tapp & Levine, 1977).
Specifically, an entire trial would be videotaped and then edited by
the presiding judge and attorneys.

This procedure would allow the

exlusion of objectionable information, as well as allow the judge to
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give clear instructions to jurors.

The relevance of videotaped trials

for this study and others involving juries is that it would allow a
comparison of the effects of edited and unedited versions on jurors'
memory for factual material presented in cases.

In addition, it v;oul ■

make a dismantling approach more feasible in order to isolate specific
factors involved in storage and retrieval in the memory process.
Examination of the non-critical memory items on which significance
was obtained revealed no clear pattern of responding either within or
across groups.

The proportions of correct versus incorrect answers to

any item in any group seemed to reflect an unexplainable random
variation when the items were reviewed individually for semantic or
syntactic problems.

While a pilot study was conducted prior to this

research to determine whether any ceiling effects existed for the
multiple-choice memory measure, it is possible that subject
characteristics differed enough from the pilot subjects to the actual
sample to cause significant differences not obtained in the pilot work.
For example, the pilot subjects' participation was requested, whereas
the actual experimental subjects volunteered.

The pilot subjects

read the transcript of the videotapes rather than viewing the trial on
tape.

Also, the pilot sample was small in comparison to the

experimental sample.

More extensive pilot work is indicated for the

construction of any future dependent measure of this type.

The

previously mentioned factors concerning the multiple influence on memory
may apply to these non-critical items that attained significance.

In

general, jurors may construct different impressions after combining
different pieces of information after exposure to the same set of basic
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facts.

Future research could include a questionnaire to determine

subject characteristics beyond those which were obtained in this study.
No significance was found among groups or across sexes on the
case outcome measure.

A higher percentage of people in all groups found

that Missoula County was "not negligent" in the death of the boy.
is consistent with the outcome of the actual trial.

This

What is interesting

to note in this study is that people's reports of the pieces of
information that were influential in their decision-making often
concerned the same points but were viewed from a different perspective.
For example, some subjects who felt that Missoula County was "negligent"
felt that the students had an inadequate amount of experience with the
heavy equipment, whereas, other subjects who found the County "not
negligent" felt that the students had enough experience.
subjects who chose "negligent" gave reasons such as:

Similarly,

"not enough

supervision", "Pat was a very careful student", "family deserved to
get a financial award", and "it was the instructors' responsibility to
assign partners", while subjects who chose "not negligent" noted
reasons like:

"adequate supervision", "Pat was careless", "the family

couldn't prove negligence", and "it was the students' responsibility
to make sure they worked with partners".

This information underscores

the individual, subjective nature of jurors' perceptions.

These

subjects saw the same 40 minutes of tape and attended to the same
information but developed opposite decisions concerning negligence.
Because research with noninteracting jurors has been criticized for not
being generalizeable, this information highlights the importance of
looking further and deeper into the individual's perceptions.
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Even

when jurors deliberate as a group, they seem to maintain individual
feelings and perceptions regarding cases, as Carretta and Moreland
C1983) found in their recent work on the "indirect" effects of judicial
instruction.

These individual differences are important to understand.

This subjective-type of information might allow researchers to
continue to design more sophisticated studies in order to increase the
degree of generalizeability of their work.
Finally, subjects' ratings of the amount of award recommended is
of some importance when considered in relation to the higher percentage
of "not negligent" verdicts among subjects.

There were no significant

differences among groups on this award recommendation and the mean
rating for all subjects (x = 3.78) suggests that, in general, jurors
recommended a small award.

An inspection of the individual measures

revealed a tendency for all subjects to choose a value slightly higher
than "1" (no award), including the subjects who decided that Missoula
County was "not negligent" and rated the degree of negligence as
"definitely not negligent".

Apparently the experimental jurors still

found some small award to be appropriate regardless of "whose fault"
the accident was.

Anecdotally, after the subjects finished with the

experimental session, many of them asked about the outcome of the actual
case and commented that they felt that the family "deserved" some
compensation for the loss of their son.
and empathie.

This response seemed emotional

One female subject even commented that she felt that any

juror who was a mother would be more sympathetic in this case and find
the County "negligent".

Decisions by jurors are clearly not made in

the absence of strong feelings about "right and wrong", which do not
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always meet a legal definition of "justice".

Subject characteristic.-;

such as age, sex, race, socio-economic status, marital status, religion,
and education are important variables to note and examine in all future
research with jurors.

This anecdotal information highlights the need

for extensive analysis of subject characteristics in research with
juries, as previously proposed.
Limitations of the present investigation include the length of
the videotaped case presentations in comparison to the actual trial.
Arlyn Simms actually was re-direct examined and re-cross examined in
the actual trial several times.

Jurors would have had a greater

opportunity to hear the relevant testimony repeated in the real trial
a number of times.

In the interest of brevity, the tapes presented

in this study were limited to 40 minutes and the witness was questioned
only once by the attorneys from each side of the case.
In addition, the present subjects were informed and aware that
the case presentation was a simulation.

This may have reduced their

ability to attend seriously to the videotapes as well as reduced the
external validity of the study in general.
A general limitation of this type of research is the use of a
sample of college students.

The literature in this area almost always

makes reference to the reduction of generalizability from college
students to an actual jury.

However, using a subject population during

a summer session yielded a much higher mean subject age (x = 28.1; than
what would have been the case had a sample been drawn from the pool of
Introductory Psychology students during the normal academic term.
The age range was 18 to 54 in this study, suggesting that results may
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be more generalizable due to a more ''representative" sample of
experimental jurors.

This represents a strength of the study.

A final limitation is that this study looked at jury decisions
based on data only from noninteracting jurors, which has been
criticized in past research.

Since the outcome decision was not the

main research interest, it is felt that this limitation is a minor one
and did not affect results on the memory items, which were the main
research interest.

Also, the subjective data previously discussed

supports the need and importance of understanding the perceptions of
individuals in the context of the jury as a group.

Summary
The present study found some important differences between groups
of subjects who heard varying levels of judicial rulings and
instructions in the recall of specific information from a civil trial.
The findings partially support the hypothesis that judicial
instruction has an effect on jurors' memories.

However, in a broader

sense, the findings elucidate the need for more precise and more
extensive research in the area of memory as it pertains to the jury
process.

Studies are needed which dismantle the decision-making

process and allow researchers to look at specific variables that may
intervene between storage and retrieval.

Studies are also : "ded

which examine and control for subject characteristics to further
understand the individual contribution to the group decision-making
process.
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While this study did not provide clear answers to any one question,
it added insight into the direction that this type of research must
take in order to be of value to the legal community.
research, each block builds

As with all

the foundation for the next.

Conventional

methodology cannot resolve the problem inherent in working with memory.
There is always the possibility that you're observing or measuring
processes based on different underlying mechanisms.
reason to stop adding blocks to the building.

This is not a

With juries, there is

much room for a continued effort at understanding the influences that
effect both individuals and the group in the process by which they
make decisions concerning such important issues.
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The Case of Pullman v s . Missoula County:

Summary

Mr. and Mrs. Albert Pullman, mother and father of the deceased,
Patrick A. Pullman, brought this law suit as sole heirs of their
deceased son against the Board of Trustees of the Missoula County
High School. Patrick was a 19-year old student at the Missoula
Technical Center.

As part of his course activities, Pat was selected

for on-the-job training at a construction project at the Lolo, Montana,
Grade School.

On April 30, 1973, while Patrick was participating as a

student assistant at the site in Lolo, he received fatal injuries when
he was struck by a D-8 Caterpillar Bulldozer.

This piece of

equipment, which backed over the deceased, was operated by Marty
Larsen, a fellow student working on the project with Patrick.

The

bulldozer had been rented from a local construction company for use
on the Lolo project.

At the time the accident occurred, the D-8

bulldozer did not have a functioning backup warning signal.
be noted that the law does not require such systems.

It should

They are a

voluntary safety precaution usually observed in the construction
industry.

INSTRUCTIONS
The videotape which you are about to view is a simulated excerpt
of the case described above. It begins about half-way through the
plaintiff's case in this jury trial (the plaintiff is the family of
Patrick Pullman).

You will see the examination and cross-examination

of a critical witness in the case, Arlyn Simons.

Mr. Simons was a
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construction supervisor employed by Missoula County and a heavy equipment
operation instructor at the Technical Center at the time of the
incident.

Prior to Simons* testimony, two other students who were

present at the scene, a maintenance man for the Lolo Grade School, and
the operator of the piece of equipment that struck Pat Pullman have
testified as to their knowledge of the circumstances of the incident.
While viewing this videotape, you are asked to serve as jurors in
the case.

It will last approximately 40 minutes and it is very important

that you give your full attention to what you are about to see and hear.
Treat this presentation as much as possible like the "real thing" with
important consequences to the family and for the Missoula County
Technical Center.
The issue at hand in this case is one of negligence.

That is,

does the responsibility for Patrick's death lie with the supervisor's
of the project on which he was working?

Was Missoula County negligent

in their supervision of the Lolo project?
After you view Mr. Simons' testimony, you will be given a
questionnaire concerning what you have seen and heard.

Again, it is

important that you put yourself in the role of an actual juror when
responding to these items and answer as if your decisions are those
that would determine the outcome of this case.
Thank you for your participation in this case.

Your decisions

will be of great value in answering questions about juror behavior
and opinions.
The videotape begins with the direct examination of Arlyn Simons
by Ms. Morrison, attorney for the plaintiffs, the Pullman family.
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Simons is then cross-examined by Mr. Riley, attorney for the defendant,
Missoula County.
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Synopsis o£ Videotapes
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(See Appendix A, Case Summary, for a general description of the case. )

The videotapes contained the testimony of the supervisor of the
Grade School construction project, Mr. Arlyn Simms (name changed to
'Simons" in order to protect privacy).

His testimony was considered

critical because, testifying as an expert who was present near the
scene of the accident, he provided an opinion that strongly suggested
that Patrick Ployhar (name changed to Pullman) was responsible for his
own death by not following standard and much-emphasized safety
precautions on the job site.

His testimony on this matter was hotly

debated as to its admissibility in the actual trial and was cause for
an appeal of the original decision.
Specifically, Simms' testimony contained the following points:
1) He was speaking with Patrick just prior to the accident.
2) He left Pat to go to deal with another problem on the site.
When he left him, Pat had the equipment for shooting grade
in his hands and was standing to the right of and behind a
D-8 Caterpillar Bulldozer that was moving forward and
backward scraping (leveling) dirt.
3) The Cat was rented, not owned by the Technical Center and
not equipped with a back-up alarm.
4) Simms did not assign a partner to Patrick when he left him
and did not instruct him to practice shooting grade in
this area.

He testified that it was Pat's responsibilitv

to get a partner and/or notify the Cat operator that he
would be working in the area behind the Cat.

These safety
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precautions had been taught to all students in the
program.
5) Marty Lytle (Larsen) was the student operator of the Cat
that struck Patrick.
6) All students had had approximately 30 hours of experience
in operating the heavy equipment.
7) Simms had approximately 15 years of experience in operating
heavy equipment.
8) All students had received extensive instruction in safety
precautions.
9) Simms did not witness the accident.
10) Patrick, in Simms' opinion caused his own death by not
observing safe practice on the job.
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Dependent Measures
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Age:

_______

Today’s Date:

Year in College:
Sex :

M

(circle one)

1 2

3

4

other

F

Instructions : Please answer the following questions about yourself and
about the casepresentation
you have just seen.
1.

Have you ever been amember
YES

2.

NO

2

3

more

Do you believe that Missoula County Technical Center was negligent
in the case of Patrick Pullman's death?
NEGLIGENT

4.

a jury before?

How many times have you been a juror?
1

3.

of

NOT NEGLIGENT

Based upon the testimony and facts presented, rate the degree of
negligence that you feel was shown by the Technical Center by
circling one of the numbers on the scale below.
1 — 2 — 3 ~ 4 — 5 — 6 ~ 7 — 8 “ 9 — 10
Definitely
Definitely Not
Negligent
Negligent

5.

Indicate how confident you are that you reached the right decision
in this case by circling one of the numbers on the scale below.
1 — 2 ~ 3 — 4 — 5 — 6 — 7 — 8 — 9 — 10
Completely
Not at all
Confident
Confident

6.

If you were to decide on an award for the Pullman family, indicate
the amount you feel wouldbe appropriate by circling one of the
numbers on the scale below.
1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 1 0
No
The highest
Award
award possible
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7.

Please state briefly which pieces of information or evidence in the
testimony you felt were most influential in your decision:_________
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INSTRUCTIONS: Please answer the following multiple-choice questions
pertaining to the testimony you just heard, based on vour best
recollection. After each question, rate your degree of confidence that
you have chosen the correct answer by circling one number from 1 - 10
on the scale below each question.
1,

Arlyn Simons has had about
heavy equipment.
a) 10
b) 20
c) 15
d) 25
1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7
Not at all
Confident
How
day
a)
b)
c)
d)

on
a)
b)
c)
d)

10

Completely
Confident

9 -

10

Completely
Confident

the pieces of equipment owned by the Vo-Tech Center
the job site were equipped with back-up warning signals.
None of
Some of
All of
Six of
1 — 2 — 3 — 4 — 5 — 6
Not at all
Confident

One
a)
b)
c)
d)

9 -

many instructors were present at the Lolo School project on the
of the incident?
2
5
1
6
1 — 2 — 3 — 4 — 5 — 6 — 7 — 8
Not at all
Confident

3.

years of experience operating

- 9 - 1 0

Completely
Confident

of the pieces of equipment used in shooting grade is called a:
California rod
Pennsylvania rod
Shooting rod
Philadelphia rod
1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 1 0
Not at all
Completely
Confident
Confident
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5.

Simons described Patrick Pullman as:
a) an average worker
b) an exceptionally good worker
c) a hard-headed worker
d) a sometimes very careless worker
1~2 — 3-4
Not at all
Confident

6.

— 5-6

— 7-8

— 9-10
Comoletely
Confident

Simons testified that the responsibility of assigning students to
work together rested with:
a) the team leaders
b) the boys themselves
c) the instructors
d) both b and c
1 — 2 — 3 — 4 — 5 — 6 — 7 — 8 — 9 — 10
Not at all
Completely
Confident
Confident

7-

When Simons left Patrick just prior to the accident, he _________
assign someone to check grade with him.
a) did
b) did not
c ) told someone else to
d) forgot to
1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 1 0
Not at all
Completely
Confident
Confident

8.

Mr.
a)
b)
c)
d)

Simons ____________ see the accident happen.
did
did not
couldn't be sure if he saw all of it
saw part of it
1 — 2 — 3 — 4 — 5 ~ 6 — 7 — 8 — 9 — 10
Not at all
Completely
Confident
Confident

9.

On the first day of the school year in the fall, students in the
heavy equipment program received:
a)
instructions on bulldozeroperation
b)
instructions on safety
c)
a general orientationto the program
d)
an orientation to thedifferenttypes
of equipment
1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 1 0
Not at all
Completely
Confident
Confident

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

10.

On the job site, students were encouraged to ___________ if they
were not operating a piece of equipment.
a) check with the supervisor for an assignment
b) watch the others on the equipment
c) practice shooting grade
d) do nothing and stay out of the way
1 - 2 - 3
Not at all
Confident

II

— 4- 5- 6- 7- 8- 9-10
Completely
Confident

Who investigated at the scene of the accident immediately after it
occurred?
a) a representative of the Sheriff's Department
b) a State Police officer
c) the director of the Vo-Tech Center
d) the other students on the job site
1 — 2 — 3 — 4 — 5 — 6 — 7 — 8 — 9 — 10
Not at all
Completely
Confident
Confident

12.

Simons testified that he ____________ recall statements being
taken from students at the scene of the accident.
a) did not
b) did
c) couldn't be sure if
d) he did not testify on this point
1 — 2 — 3 — 4 — 5 — 6 — 7 — 8 — 9 — 10
Not at all
Completely
Confident
Confident

13.

When asked if Pat Pullman stepping in behind a piece of equipment
was contrary to what he had beentaught, Mr. Simons replied that:
a) he could not answer thequestion
b) it was absolutely contrary
c) it was not an area specifically covered in the safety
instructions that students received
d) it was not contrary
1 — 2 — 3 — 4 — 5 — 6 — 7 — 8 — 9 — 10
Not at all
Completely
Confident
Confident
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14.

Looking back from a sitting position on the Cat, a person kneeling
down might be difficult to see because of the ____________ behind
the operator.
a) box-like structure
b) small window
c) heavy wire screen
d) canvas covering
1 — 2 — 3 — 4 — 5 — 6
Not at all
Confident

15.

7 - 8 - 9 - 1 0
Completely
Confident

When the Caterpillar tracks were viewed after the accident it was
found that the machine was backing up:
a) to the right of its forward direction
b) along the same line that it had gone forward
c) to the left of its forward direction
d) in an erratic fashion
1 — 2 — 3 — 4 — 5 — 6 — 7
Not at all
Confident

17.

10

Completely
Confident

In Mr. Simon's opinion, would a back-up alarm on the Cat that
struck Patrick have made any difference in this accident?
a) yes
b) no
c) he couldn't say
d) he did not testify on this point
1 — 2 — 3 — 4 — 5 — 6
Not at all
Confident

16.

- 9 -

9-10
Completely
Confident

The day after the accident, Simons went to the Pullman family home
with:
a) Mr. Brown
b) a police investigator
c) another instructor from the school
d) Marty Larson
1 _ 2 - 3 - 4
Not at all
Confident

5 — 6 - 7 - 8

9 -

10

Completely
Confident
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18.

Marty Larson was operating the Cat that backed over Patrick:
a) with a supervisor on the Cat with him
b) with another student
onthe Cat
c) alone
d) with two other students on the Cat with him
1 — 2 — 3 ~ 4 — 5 ~ 6 — 7 — 8 — 9 — 10
Not at all
Completely
Confident
Confident

19.

How
day
a)'
b)
c)
d)

many students were present at the Lolo construction site on the
of the accident?
15 - 16
18 - 20
20 - 25
30
1 — 2 — 3 — 4 — 5 — 6 — 7 — 8 — 9 — 10
Not at all
Completely
Confident
Confident

20.

How many pieces of equipment were being used at the Lolo School
construction site?
10
a)
b) 12
c) 5
d) 6
1
2
3
Not at all
Confident
—

—

—

4

—

5

—

6

—

7

—

8

—

9

—

10
Completely
Confident
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